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EMPTY GESTURES: THE (IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT
ATTEMPTS TO LIBERALIZE ALGERIAN FAMILY LAW
In April 1998, Algerian lawmakers made two noteworthy
changes concerning family law legislation. On the surface, these
changes seemed to signify important progress in the battle to
reestablish rights for women in Algeria, a country with a strong
feminist past' and a violent and undeniably anti-feminist present.2
Early in April 1998, the Algerian government approved a draft
law on women's rights.' This law, if passed, would replace a law
inspired by Islamic shari'a law, which many feel keeps women
subordinate to men.4 Essentially, the new law would make it more
difficult for men to have multiple wives, requiring the consent of
each woman involved in the marriage for the polygamous marriage
to be legal.5 Additionally, this law would entitle a woman to own
the family home in instances of divorce provided that she has won
custody of her children in court.6 It is interesting that, in the
months since April 1998, this law has been shrouded in mysterious
1. See, e.g., KHALIDA MEsSAOUDI & EuSABETH SCHEMLA, UNBOWED: AN ALGERIAN
WOMAN CONFRONTS IsLAMIc FUNDAMENTALISM 27-28 (Anne C. Vila trans., 1998) (discussing
the following strong female figures in Algerian history: Lalla Yamina, an early 20th century
woman who refused marriage and rebelled against her family and who has been recognized
as a saint; Lalla Fadhma N'Soumeur, who-like other Algerian women--organized a resistance against French colonization in the 19th century;, and Ia Kahina, a pre-Arab Algerian
who led an army against Arab invaders during the 8th century); id. at 46-52 (discussing the
feminist battle against the implementation of the anti-woman Family Code during the
1980s); Marnia Lazreg, Feminism and Difference: The Perils of Writing as a Woman on
Women in Algeria, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 326, 333-34 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox
Keller eds., 1990) (commenting on the continuous misunderstanding of Algerian women by
French feminist theorists and noting the unrecognized strength of Algerian women in
fighting for independence from France during the 1950s); Rod Skilbeck, The Shroud over
Algeria: Femicide, Islamism and the Hijab, 2 J. ARABIC, ISLAMIC, & MIDDLE E. STUD. 43
(1995) (visited Oct. 28, 1998) <http'J/www. netspace.net.au/-rod/alg/shroud.html> ("In the
1960s Algeria was one of the leading Arab states in terms of female rights and advancement.
Female empowerment... came to the fore within the [National Liberation Front] during
liberation, where more than ten thousand women fought for independence. .. 1.
2. See generally MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1 (discussing the life experiences
of Messaoudi, a prominent Algerian feminist, during Algeria's independence from France).
3. See Algeria Proposes Rights Law, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 7, 1998, at A15,
availablein WL 04/07/1998 GLOBEMAIL A16.
4. See id.; see also Joblle Entelis, Note, InternationalHuman Rights: Islam'sFriendor
Foe7, 20 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1251, 1272 (1997) (noting conflicts between the Family Code of
1984 and the equal rights provided for women in the Algerian Constitution); Leila Danesh,
Algerian Women in Politics, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, Aug. 3, 1997 (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http//metimes.com/'ssue31Ireg/algwomen.htm> ('[Algerian women] are hindered by strict
interpretations of sharid with regard to legislation, particularly the Family Code of 1984,
which relegates women to the status of minors in society.*).
5. See Algeria ProposesRights Law, supra note 3
6. See id.
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silence-the only mention that has been made of its passage (or
failure) in the press was in January 1999.'
Throughout the month of April 1998, Algerian lawmakers also
considered the issue of abortion rights for rape victims.8 Estimates
reveal that Islamist extremists have raped thousands of Algerian
women since violence erupted in Algeria in 1992, after the army
cancelled national elections that would have been won by an Islamic
political party.9 Many of these women have become pregnant.' °
These pregnancies have resulted in great shame and trauma for
rape victims because so much of Algeria embraces conservative
Islamic traditions which attach a tremendous stigma to extra- or
pre-marital sex and to unchaste women." Islam prohibits abortion
unless the mother's life is endangered. Therefore, under Islamic
law, all healthy, pregnant rape victims must carry their children. 2
The April 1998 changes to abortion law for rape victims were
important to all Algerians because both women's lives and religious

7. In January 1999, the Algerian Ambassador to the United Nations, Abdallah Baali,
discussed the rights of Algerian women before the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). He noted that some provisions of the Family
Code were "crumbling." See Algerian Women Full Actors in Political,Economic Life, AR.
NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 27, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 7646086. At that time, Nadia Mohand
Amer, Assistant Director for Women, Ministry of Solidarity and the Family, observed that
women's status was based largely on shari'a.See id. Discussing child custody, however, she
noted that women would no longer be given custody of their children only at the death of the
children's father. Under a revision of Algerian law, a mother would be given custody of her
children in the event that the children's father abandoned the family or disappeared. See id.
Thus, it appears that the Algerian legislature may be close to passing the draft law that this
Note discusses or a law of similar content and importance. See id. The proposed law,
however, has not yet been made effective. See id.
8. See Cesar Chelala, Mixed Signals on Abortions and Victims of Wartime Rape in
Algeria, EARTH TIMES, June 11, 1998 (visited Jan. 6, 1999)
<http'J/www.earthtimes.orgfjun/opinionmixedsignalsonabortionsjunll1998.htm>.
9. Estimates of the number of women raped during terrorist uprisings vary. See, e.g.,
Algerian Religious Body Issues Fatwa on Rape, AGENCE FRANCE- PRESSE, Apr. 27, 1998,
availablein 1998 WL 2269670 (estimating between 1,000 and 3,000 rapes); Chella, supra
note 8 (estimating 1,600 known rape victims and suggesting that more than 2,000 unknown
rape victims have been killed by their attackers); Thousands of Women Raped in Algerian
Conflict: Report, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 6, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16672402

(estimating 2,000 rapes).
10. See Chelala, supra note 8 ("[Mlany of those.., were pregnant.").
11. See, e.g., Algeria Renews Ban on Abortion for Rape Victims, CNN INTERACTIVE:
WORLD
NEWS
STORY
PAGE,
Apr.
11,
1998
<http//www.enn.omfWORLD/africa9804127(RBOO0718.reut.html>
('Many rape
victims have been ostracized by their families .... "); Cesar Chelala, Algerian Abortion
Controversy HighlightsRape of War Victims, LANCET, May 9, 1998, available in 1998 WL
14104826 ("Because of strong conservative traditions in Algerian society, many families of
the victims will not allow them to return home.").
12. See Chelala, supra note 11.
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tradition were at stake." Many were shocked when, on April 12,
1998, Algeria's Islamic High Council (HCI) issued a fatwa, or holy
edict, concerning abortion. 4 According to one Algerian newspaper,
the fatwa would allow abortions for women raped during attacks by
Islamic extremists.15 Yet the following day, two other Algerian
newspapers reported that there could be no such fatwa because the
president of Algeria, Liamine Zeroual, had not approved it.' All
the same, the controversy surrounding the issuance of the fatwa
drew attention to the frequency of rape in Algeria and to the
suffering of victims and their families.' 7 Finally, at the end of April,
the HCI resolved the matter by decreeing that rape victims could
have abortions in cases of "absolute necessity."' The fatwa
mandated that Algerians consider all rape victims to be "honorable
and chaste."' 9 It also ordered that Algerians not "blameD or
punish[]" the victim.2 ° The fatwa added that the State would care
for children of rape.2 '
This Note will explore the strange, although brief, histories (or
non-histories) of these two changes in Algerian family law. This
Note will establish that the treatment of these new lawsparticularly the disturbing vagueness, confusion, and controversy
surrounding them-is emblematic of the current situation ofwomen
in Algeria. The first part of this Note provides necessary
background concerning the history and politics of the turmoil in
Algeria. The second part discusses the misapplication of Islamic
shari'a law by Algerian fundamentalists and its effect on women.
The third part addresses how the Algerian Family Code strips
women of powers and rights. The fourth part considers the
situation of women in Algeria, in view of recent history and current
events.
Parts five and six comment upon the surprising
insignificance of the proposed marriage law and the abortion-rape
fatwa, respectively, in terms of women's rights. Considering the
13. See id.
14. See id. ([The] edict (fatwa)... sent shock waves through the Arab world... [because
it] allow[ed] abortions for women raped by Islamic extremists.")
15. See id. (citing AL KHABAR, Apr. 12, 1998).
16. See id. (citing LE MATIN and LA TRIBUNE, Apr. 13, 1998).
17. See, e.g., supranote 9.
18. Algerian Religious Body Issues Fatwa on Rape, supra note 9.
19. Id. When the fatwa was announced, Algeria's National Solidarity Minister, Rabea
Mechernene, praised the HCI for its idea that raped women would remain chaste. She
announced a plan to open a center for helping victims of rape. See id.; Hostel Opens for Rape
Victims, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 19, 1998, at A13, available in WL 10/19/1998
GLOBEMAIL A13.
20. Algerian Religious Body Issues Fatwa on Rape, supra note 9.
21. See id.
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lack of importance of these legal changes, this Note concludes that
these two changes alone are not sufficient to improve the situation
of women in Algeria.
ALGERIA'S POLITICAL HISTORY

Algeria: PerpetuallyColonized, Perpetuallyat War
In 1962, Algeria won its independence from France after eight
years at war.2 2 Yet strangely enough, many Algerians who have
grown up in the post-independence era remain unaware of much of
the nation's hundreds of years of colonial history. They know only
of the Arab influence in Algeria.23 The National Liberation Front
(FLN), the political party that controlled the Algerian government
from 1962 until 1991, ran Algerian schools and ensured that
Algerian students remained ignorant of any pre-Arab colonizers in
Algeria.2" The FLN also promoted widespread ignorance of more
recent controversies in Algerian history, which could confuse
students' Arab loyalties. 25 Algerian leaders continue these efforts
today, in hopes of "defin[ing] their country according to its Arab and
Islamic roots only, blotting out the rest."26
Despite attempts to bury Algeria's past, the country's long
colonial history and rich cultural heritage remain important. The
current dissension and bloodshed in Algeria grew out of that
history.27 Reporter Sarah Chayes discussed and summarized the
colonial history of Algeria as follows:
Again and again, Algerians refer to... questions of history and
language, to a sense that people vying for power keep trying to
reduce their country's complex identi[tjy, to one single feature,
with disastrous consequences. Algeria began with the Berbers
[ethnic Algerians] and their language. The Phoenician and
Roman empire left ruins on the land. In the 8th century, the
Arabs brought their language and religion.

22. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at xii.

23. See id. at 39.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 39-40; see also Sarah Chayes & Brooke Gladstone, Algeria, NPRWEEKEND
SATURDAY, Aug. 1, 1998, availablein LEXIS News Library, NPR File, Transcript #98080109214 (discussing the omission of the "'realstory' of the war for independence from Algerian
history books, quoting Uncle Radji, an Algerian demonstrator).
26. Chayes & Gladstone, supra note 25 (quoting Algerian poet and activist Les Hari
Lubta).
27. See id.
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Before 130 years of French colonialism beginning in the early
19th century, Algeria experienced Ottoman rule and an influx of
Muslims expelled from Spain, who had lived side-by-side with
Christians and Jews for centuries.28
As the cultural composition of Algeria has changed over the
centuries, there has been a constant battle over the nation's
identity.2 9 The recent controversy over Algeria's national language
demonstrates that two of the country's oldest groups, the Berbers
and the Arabs/Muslims, remain at the heart of its national identity
crisis.'
Extreme violence by Islamists characterizes Algeria's current
crisis.31 They have directed this violence against Berbers,3 2 against
the press,' against educated' and politically controversial
women, 35 and against women who refuse to veil themselves.m
Through bloodshed, occupation, and government control, the Arab28. See id.; see also MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 39 (discussing the
government's work to distort, rather than to omit, some history from history books by
presenting the Turks and the Ottoman Empire "as a 'Muslim presence").
29. See Chayes & Gladstone, supra note 25.
30. See Popular Algerian Singer's Death Prompts Fear and Anger Among Berber
Population,FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Fintme
File [hereinafter Singer's Death] (discussing the connection between the death of a Berber
singer-activist, the Algerian identity struggle, and the new law proclaiming Arabic the
national language of Algeria).
31. See Chelala, supra note 11.
32. See id; see also Algerian Massacres,ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (NPR Radio Broadcast,
Aug. 29, 1997), availablein 1997 WL 12833349 (printing an interview with Marnia Lazreg,
a professor of women's studies in New York, who discussed the targeting of "innocent
civilians").
33. See Nick Ryan, Truth UnderSiege, THE MOJO WIRE [MOTHERJONES WEBSITE] (Aug.
11, 1998) <http'Ilwww.mojones.com/news-wire/algeria.html>; see alsoAfrica.at.Large:1998
Survey: Fewer JournalistsKilled but Still as Many in Jail, AFR.NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 31,
1998, availablein 1998 WL 21358822 (explaining that killings have declined because of'the
changing nature of violence in Algeria").
34. See Karima Bennoune, S.O.S. Algeria: Women's Human Rights Under Siege, in
FAITH & FREEDOM: WOMEN'S RIGHTS INTHE MUSLIM WORLD 184,188 (Mahnaz Alkhami ed.,
1995) (discussing violence against professional women and women in other untraditional
roles); id. at 190-92 (noting that professional women who are not victimized by violence often
find themselves harassed and threatened); id. at 198-99 (discussing women's daily battles
to receive and professionally implement their education in public).
35. See id. at 197-98 (noting the Islamists' problems with "public women"). In 1993, the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamic fundamentalist organization, issued an irreversible
fatwa condemning prominent Algerian feminist and political activist Khalida Messaoudi to
death. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 165-66. Several attempts have been
made on Messaoudi's life. See id. at 1-8, 162-63, 165-66.
36. See Skilbeck, supra note 1; see also MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 108-16
(discussing the central role that sexuality and the veil play generally in the Islamic
fundamentalist movement and, more specifically, in the violence in Algeria); Bennoune,
supra note 34, at 187 (discussing particular instances of violence against women who go
without the hijab (veil)).
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Islam population appears to be winning most battles to define
Algeria." In fact, much to the detriment of national safety and the
everyday lives of most Algerians, additional colonizers, including
Iranian and Saudi Arabian Islamists, have come to the aid of

Islamic Algerians.

8

These foreign Islamists have given financial

and ideological assistance to Islamic extremists in their campaign

for control of Algeria. 9 This fundamentalist influence has created
a violent, dogmatic Islamist youth culture and has transformed
Algeria into a land of terrorism. 40
The War over Algeria in the 1990s
The nominally socialist 4 ' FLN governed Algeria after the

country won its independence from France in 1962.42 The FLN,

37. See Chayes & Gladstone, supranote 25.
38. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 69-70.

39. Khaida Messaoudi notes, "it is undeniably true that Saudi Arabia and Iran, the
leaders of the two Islamist Internationals, supported and financed the Algerian
fundamentalist movements." Id. at 69. She believes that the overall poverty of Algerians
and the economic failure of the Algerian government during the 19809 left the nation prey
to Islamic extremism and to the influence of Saudi Arabia in particular. See id. at 69-70.
Messaoudi also notes that Algeria's allowance of these fundamentalist influences has had
dire consequences for Algerian women. See id. Geraldine Brooks comments that Saudi
Arabian money gives the Saudi Arabian radical brand of Islam a great deal of clout
throughout the Muslim World. See New Book Details Paradoxesof Women in Islam, ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED, (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 28, 1995), availablein 1995 WL 2917755
[hereinafter New Book] (reporting an interview with Geraldine Brooks, author of NINE PARTS
OF DESIRE, which explores the paradoxes that exist for Islamic women). Another important
observation may be the possibility of the influence of Afghanistan in Algerian
fundamentalism. A recent New York Times article notes that the Armed Islamic Group
(GIA), the primary perpetrator of Algerian violence, is led by Islamists who "trained as
volunteers against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan." John F. Burns, Unforeseen,Strife
Eases for Algeria, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, at 1.
40. Messaoudi, a former teacher, discusses the changes in her students' ideals
throughout the 19809, as Algeria gradually descended into violence. See MESSAOUDI &
SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 71-81. She also discusses the pivotal role of the fundamentalist
extremist FIS in bringing about the nation's current strife and bloodshed. See id. at 91-107,
117-27, 133-135.
41. Seeid. at91.
42. Rod Skilbeck describes the war as follows:
The battle for independence-a bloody unnamed war from 1955-1962 touted by
the National Liberation Front (FLN) as a socialist revolution-was more a
battle by French-educated Algerians to remove the French echelons from above
them in the power structure. Casualty estimates for this exercise are placed
around 600000-1 million deaths, including the purging of over 100000
collaborators after Independence by the FLN.
Skilbeck, supra note 1 (citing Robert Fisk, Scenes from an Unholy War, THE INDEPENDENT,
Apr. 16, 1995, at 4).
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however, began to crumble, however, in the 1980s.43 Rod Skilbeck
explains the rise of the FLN's Islamist competitor:
From the late 1970s onwards Islamist groups had appeared
across the nation calling for less secular and state control of
society and the economy.... The bloody suppression of riots in
October 1988... caused a crisis of legitimacy in the FLN and
led to the creation of a multi-party system and the almost
immediate formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)[,] an
umbrella party of neighbourhood committees.
The Islamist groups were the most mobili [zed, well-funded
and readied of all political groups when elections were
announced. The FIS won 55% of municipal seats in 1990."
Skilbeck goes on to explain the progress of Algerian politics
throughout the early 1990s, a progress which ultimately led to the
current civil war:
In the first round of polling on December 26th 1991, the FIS
won 10 seats for every one the ruling FLN secured. [The
President] was pressured to resign by the military, and, on
January 11th 1992 the second round of elections-and certain
FIS majority in parliament-were cancelled and a High Council
of State established.
By April the FIS was banned, most of its leaders were in
jail and an armed wing run by Afghan veterans had formed (the
AIS-Army of Islamic Salvation). Nevermore [sic] than a
collection of groups--the FIS began to splinter."
When the FIS fell apart, the young extremists who had
composed its majority began to convey their message through
violence." Many of them formed the Armed Islamic Group (GIA),

43. See i& (noting the advent of perestroika in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as
well as party corruption and mass unemployment, as a cause for this decay).
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Lahouari Addi, Algeria's Army, Algeria's Agony, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
July/Aug. 1998, at 44, 44 (suggesting that the lack of information about ongoing murders by
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) members, and the lack ofwillingness of the Algerian government
to permit international inquiry into the killings, might mean that the GIA was actually a
product of the country's intelligence service, designed to place the Islamists in a negative
light).
46. See Skilbeck, supra note 1.
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which was bent on jihad as the means of determining Algeria's
rulers.4 7
Now, seven years later, the GIA's holy war continues. A recent
newspaper article estimated that this 'Muslim insurgency" has
caused at least 75,000 deaths.4 In the beginning, at least, the
conflict seemed to be politics. A closer look, however, exposes the
real issues in this holy war. Islamists are not merely at war with
political opponents; they are, instead, engaging in a bloody war of
ideals.4 9 They seek to create an Islamic state. In doing so, they
mean to root out secularism," as well as any remaining Algerian

folk tradition, including, for example, Berberism."'
It would be remiss to discuss the holy war in Algeria without
recognizing the irony implicit in the means used by the warrior

Islamists to accomplish their goal of establishing an Islamic state.52
In hopes of establishing this state, the Islamists have been
committing genocide and alienating Algeria's civilian population.53
Marnia Lazreg, an Algerian woman and a professor at Hunter

College in New York City, has described the conflict between the
Islamist means and ends as follows:
The [AIGI is engaged in a very nihilistic course of action.... [It
has really engaged in random violence .... This is obviously not
very productive, because if [it] were really serious about...
establishing an Islamic republic, [it] would not be targeting
47. See id.; see also Burns, supranote 39 ('Western intelligence estimates have put [the
GIA's] strength at about 3,000 men, but this is little more than a guess.).
48. See Still Afflicted by Violence, Algeria Hopes Worst Is Over, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3,
1999, at A22, availablein 1999 WL 6041752 [hereinafter Still Afflicted by Violence]. Even
more recent Western estimates suggest that approximately 100,000 Algerians have been
killed, whereas official reports from the Algerian government insist that only 30,000 have
died during the war. See Algerian Violence Claims Eight More Lives, AGENCE FRANCEPRESSE, Mar. 25, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2570848.
49. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 118 (noting that the FIS attacks
democracy as "impious"); see also Algeria Bomb Blast, Massacre PortendAnother Bloody
Ramadan, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESsE, Dec. 3, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16652206
[hereinafter Algeria Bomb Blast](citing the decree of the Armed Islamist Group that people
who reject its doctrine, including children, must be killed).
50. SeeAlgeriaBomb Blast,supranote 49 ("The Armed Islamic Group, the most radiacal
[sic] of Algeria's armed Islamists, has decreed that the entire population of Algeria rejects
its doctrine and is therefore guilty of apostasy and consequently must be put to death, women
and children, even unborn children, included."); see also MESSAOUDI &SCHEMLA, supranote
1, at 118 (relating that a prominent member of the FIS frequently said that "there was no
place for secularists, Berberists, communists, and so on in an Islamic society"); id. at 141-42
(discussing the issues involved in the battle between Islamism and secularism).
51. See Chayes & Gladstone, supra note 25; Singer'sDeath, supra note 30.
52. See Algerian Massacres,supra note 32 (noting that Islamic militants have turned to
terrorism).
53. See id.
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innocent civilians, men, women, children, babies... suckling
their mothers' breasts."
In the war to establish an Islamic government, as opposed to a
secular, military regime,5 sex and sexuality stand out as
highlighted issues." Khalida Messaoudi has commented that the
FIS has "a constant obsession, of the kind that is symptomatic of
madness: an obsession with women."57 Messaoudi believes that
sexuality lies at the heart of this fixation:
The fundamentalists, like any totalitarian movement, want to
exercise absolute control over society, and they fully realized
that the place to start was by seizing control of women's
sexuality, something Mediterranean-style patriarchy facilitates.
In addition, like all purifiers, they hate and persecute
difference, which inevitably accompanies democracy. Now,
what women represent is desire, seduction, mystery, trouble,
and also alterity, which is immediately visible on their bodies.
That is why the Islamists are so anxious to hide the female
body, to veil it .... The women who refuse to submit to this
become perfect targets, because they embody the Other that the
fundamentalists need to mobilize and rally people to their
cause."
Islamists have targeted these unveiled, unconventional women
for death, mutilation, decapitation, rape, and a frightening
phenomenon-zaouadj el moutad, or temporary marriage-through
which women are kidnapped and forced to "marry," essentially for
sex, for a few hours or days. 5 Consequently, the war has had a
devastating effect not only on educated, professional, and unveiled
women, but also on the overall treatment of Algerian women and
the very notion of "woman" in Algeria.'0
The more one learns about the outrageous disorder and human
rights abuses in Algeria, 1 the more she wonders how these horrors
can keep occurring. It is difficult to combat what one cannot
54. Id.
55. SeegenerallyAddi, supra note 45 (discussingthe interaction between the government

and the army).
56. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supranote 1, at 108.
57. Id.
58. I& at 109.
59. See id. at 114. Messaoudi notes that women who refuse to participate in these

temporary marriages are routinely and horrifically raped and killed. See id.
60. See discussion infra notes 74-121 and accompanying text.
61. See AMNESTY INTL USA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1998, ALGERIA 78-82
(1998) [hereinafter AMNESTY REPORT].
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understand, and to access the truth behind the outrageous violence
in Algeria is nearly impossible. This problem exists at both a
national and an international level.6 2 Violence against journalists,o
along with censorship of independent newspapers" and overall
state control of the Algerian press,6 5 has caused a severe shortage
of information. Several factors exacerbate this shortage. Official
doublespeak 6s and Algerian language barriers"7 create credibility
and communication problems and make it difficult to trust
information about events in Algeria.
The very subject of-and research for-this Note demonstrate
the significance of this truth problem. As the discussion in Parts
six and seven suggests, problems with dissemination and credibility
undermine the overall importance, as well as the enforceability, of
any new laws.

62. International newspapers have been unable to report fully or accurately on Algerian
affairs. See Ben Macintyre, When NoNews Means BadNews, TIMES(London), Nov. 14,1998,
availablein 1998 WL 4876139 ("Our understanding of what is happening in that suffering
country is at best indistinct, but without the indigenous, privately owned Algerian
newspapers, it would be virtually non-existent."). In addition, Islamist fundamentalists have
slain journalists foreign to Algeria as a part of their campaign of violence against the press.
See Ryan, supra note 33

63. See generally Ryan, supra note 33 (discussing the dangerous conditions journalists
encounter in Algeria).
64. See id.; see also Macintyre, supra note 62; Emily Walmsley, Algeria: Newspaper
Seized, CensorshipGoes on asNormal, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (last modified Sept. 30, 1999)
<http'i/www.oneworld.org/index.odnewsalgeria300197.html>.
65. See Ryan, supra note 33.
66.[The reality of events has been turned inside out by government-issued
statements. Lara Marlowe, a journalist with Time magazine, has written that
"when the Algerian government uses words.... the words mean exactly what
the government chooses." On 4 January [1997] the prime minister, Ahmed
Ouyahia, spoke on Algerian radio to announce the country's triumph over
terrorism: "not a slogan," he said, 'but a statement based on facts." When yet
another village is massacred by armed groups, it befits such a statement that
the press is kept silent.
Walmaley, supra note 64.
67. Algeria's different newspapers represent its different linguistic communities.
Newspapers are in French, Arabic, and Algerian Arabic. For example, Le Matin is a French
independent newspaper. See Ryan, supra note 33. Another French newspaper, El Watan,
is the largest independent French paper, and El Ehabar is the largest-selling Arabic
newspaper. See id. These newspapers may "break" different stories; their readers do not
necessarily receive the same news. See id.
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POWERLESSNESS JUSTIFIED: SHARI'A, FUNDAMENTALISM, AND

THEIR EFFECTS ON WOMEN

What Is Shari'a?
Shari'a (or charia)is the canon law of Islam. 8 As Messaoudi
and Schlemla explain, the term, "shari'a,"can be used in two
ways. 9 Used generally, it may refer to the entire body of texts
compiled in the Koran, the hadiths (words of Mohammed), and the
writings and teachings ofvarious religious authorities and imams. 0
Used specifically, it describes the application of holy law to an
Islamic state.71 This Note uses both meanings of the term.72
Although Algeria is not an Islamic state, some of its constitution
and all of its Family Code are based on canon law;7 thus, it is
necessary to discuss Islamic canon law as applied by Algeria as a
state.
FundamentalistAbuses of Shari'a
Shari'a provides the basis for much of Algeria's law.74 The
general promulgation of this canon law in Algeria presents
problems for Algerian women,7 much in the way that its overall
dominion in wholly Islamic states subjugates and denigrates
women.7" As many Muslims and scholars of Islam are quick to note,
however, the Islamic faith is not the source of the mistreatment of
the women of Islam. Instead, they posit that the prophet

68. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supranote 1, at 155.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id Messaoudi and Schemla define the term "shari'a"in its more specific usage
by referring to its application in the Islamic states of Saudi Arabia and Iran. See id.
72. See, e.g., infra notes 74-121 and accompanying text (referring to 8hari'ain its general

meaning); infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (referring to shari'a in its specific
meaning).
73. SeeAlgeriaProposesRights Law, supra note 3; see also Entelis, supra note 4, at 1272

("The [Algerian) Constitution contains a mix of both secular and Islamic references, while
shari'alaw is the only basis of the Family Code.*).

74. See Entelis, supra note 4, at 1272.
75. See discussion infranotes 122-61 and accompanying text ofthe Algerian Family Code.
76. Traditional Islamic states have tended to relegate women to a "private" sphere,
focusing on family and housework, whereas they have placed men in a "public sphere." See

Entelis, supra note 4, at 1270. She explains that unequal rights are a fact of life for the
women of Islam and that human rights violations against women are common in Islamic
states because Islamists view those violations as being consistent with the holy law that
binds them. See id. at 1270-72.

622

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 6:611

Mohammed improved women's lives, giving them freedom, dignity,
and rights."
Journalist and author Geraldine Brooks believes that the antiwoman aspects of Islamic law and culture result from early
misinterpretations and culture-specific additions to the faith."'
Brooks explains that the original teachings and texts of Islam
supported women and their sexuality.79 She suggests that Islam's
originally liberating message became tainted as it spread through
and then out of Arabia during the seventh century."' According to
Brooks, the association of Islam with societies that abused or
ignored women created a religious culture that supported the
mistreatment and subjugation of women."1
Brooks is not alone in her notion that Islam has grown away
from its more egalitarian beginnings. s2 A number of Muslim
feminists believe that men have misinterpreted the Koran for their
own gain.' Buthena Sihbahn, a Syrian professor, explains,
Women have a very fair share in the Islamic text, and...
Muslim feminists 0 have a very important task[:] ... to try and
point out that.., the laws which govern Muslim women in the
name of Islam are truly un-Islamic, and Islam gives women
much better rights than what some men claim."
77. See In Islamic Nations, the Veil is Lifting, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29, 1998, at All,
available in 1998 WL 9125305.
During the "Jahaliya," the time of ignorance that Muslims say preceded Islam,
women were sold or stolen and infant girls sometimes buried alive-practices
decried in the Koran.
Through the revelations, Mohammed also conferred some autonomy on
women, from the right to inheritance, even if half that of a man, to the right to
own property.
Id.
78. See New Book, supranote 39. Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi is particularly
emphatic on this issue. See In Islamic Nations, the Veil is Lifting, supra note 77 ("You
cannot put the repression of women on the prophet.... That guy liberated women.").
79. See New Book, supra note 39. ("[In fact, Muhammad extolled women's sexuality.
He saw sexuality of all kinds as a God-given natural impulse, and that God had given rules
about how you satisfied that impulse but within those rules, which is within marriage,
basically you're very free to explore all the dimensions ofhuman sexuality.") Muhammed also
encouraged women's ideas by supporting their involvement in politics. See id.
80. See ia
81. See id.
82. See Muslim Women Gather to Discuss Responses to Militants, MORNING EDITION
(NPR radio broadcast, May 13, 1996), availablein 1996 WL 2814717 [hereinafter Muslim
Women Gather).
83. See id.; In IslamicNations, the Veil is Lifting, supranote 77.
84. Muslim Women Gather,supranote 82. Women in some Islamic countries are working
on new interpretations of the Koran, which they hope to work into revised family codes for
their countries. See In Islamic Nations, the Veil is Lifting, supranote 77.
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In essence, the trouble for Algerian women does not begin with
the fact that their personal and family lives are under the control
of Islamic canon law."5 Rather, it begins with the fact that, for
centuries, men have created this law by interpreting holy texts.
The ignorance of Algerians concerning their own culture seems
to contribute to the woes ofAlgerian women under Islamic holy law.
Algerians, in general, tend to be poorly-versed in Islamic texts and
traditions.8 7 Educational changes in the 1970s and 1980s left
Algerians under the age of 30 to 35 poorly educated. 8 They
received all-Arabic schooling and learned a revised history of their
country. 9 As a result, Algerians tend to be ignorant concerning
important aspects of their religion and culture." Their ignorance
seems to have left them prey to harsh applications or
misapplications ofshari'alaw.9 ' A general ignorance and apathy on
the part of Algerians allowed the FIS, the fundamentalists, to gain
power in Algeria.92 Once frustrated by the cancellation of elections

85. See In Islamic Nations,the Veil is Lifting, supra note 77 (noting that the family codes
based on Islamic law set rules for even the most intimate aspects of women's lives). This
control of specific aspects of women's lives does cause problems. See discussion infra notes
122-61 and accompanying text (concerning the Algerian Family Code).
86. See In Islamic Nations, the Veil is Lifting, supra note 77; see also discussion infra
notes 130-61 and accompanying text (concerning the specific product of these male
interpretations of the Algerian Family Code).
87. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 32-45, 71-81 (discussing the evolution
of Algerian education during the 1970s and 1980s into an all-Arabic, fundamentalist system).
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 23-26. Many Algerians, however,
have received rather secular upbringings because their families identify as Berber, not Arab,
or because they did not grow up in devout, or fundamentalist, families. Messaoudi is one such
Algerian. See MESSAOUDi & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 9-17.
91. Messaoudi discusses Algerian support to Iran and Khomeini during the Iranian
Revolution. She cites Algeria's turbulent history as a reason why Algeria would support any
revolution, regardless of its horrific circumstances. She also notes that Algerians, herself
included, were unwilling, and unable, to see similarities between themselves and Iranians,
or to see that their women might receive poor treatment from Islamists. See MESSAOUDI &
SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 63-65. Messaoudi also confesses that Algerians are fully
responsible for the fundamentalists' influence in Algeria. See id. at 69 (We, the Algerians
[allowed Saudi Arabia and Iran to support and finance Algerian fundamentalists]--either out
of ideological complicity, pure and simple, or because we had set in place all the conditions
that allowed them to interfere in our affairs, or because we underestimated the danger.").
92. See i& at 93 (implying that much initial support for the FIS was based in that group's
apparent goal of fighting a "corrupt bourgeois government" and noting that such support
ignored the group's fundamentalist basis, its violence, and its goal ofestablishing an Islamic
state).
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in 1991,"3 that power evolved into outrageous violence against
Algerian women. 9
The fundamentalist presence in Algeria has heightened the
distress that shari'a causes for women to horrific proportions.95 The
fundamentalist Islamists currently waging holy war against
Algerian civilians use shari'a to justify their conservative, often
oppressive rules, 96 which, Geraldine Brooks suggests, did not
originate with Mohammed or the Koran.97 9Instead, they use shari'a
to excuse their terrorism against women.
Algerian Islamists' behavior becomes all the more appalling
when one considers that, like all Algerians schooled since Algerian
independence, their knowledge has been restricted and
manipulated. 9 Khalida Messaoudi provides a chilling example of
the extent of fundamentalist ignorance when she tells of one of her
experiences as a math professor in Algiers.' 00 One of her students,
arriving to class before her, would draw - a swastika on the
blackboard.' 0 ' Her students had not been educated about the
holocaust, nor about genocide.' 2 Instead, a history teacher had
simply told his students that they should admire Hitler for killing
Jews and western nonbelievers. 1"3 Messaoudi herself had to explain
to this student that they, Arabs, were Semites, and that the Nazis
would have killed them along with the Jews.'"'
93. See supratext accompanying note 45.
94. Messaoudi gives an Algerian's inside perspective on the events of 1991. See
MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 117-32. She explains that fundamentalist violence
did not begin until March 1993, months after the June 1992 assassination of Algerian
President Mohamed Boudiaf, who had taken a no-nonsense approach toward the Islamists
and had gone so far as to dissolve the FIS in March 1992. See id. at 126-31.
95. See Bennoune, supra note 34, at 187-92.
96. See, e.g., MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 109 (he fundamentalists invoke
Islam to justify a priori and legitimize all their words and deeds."). For instance, Messaoudi
describes an incident in which a fundamentalist woman told uncovered women in a
bathhouse that God did not like their nakedness. See id. at 112.
97. See New Book, supra note 39.
98. Although Messaoudi describes various instances ofviolence justified by the FIS in the
name of religion, particularly against women, see MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at
188, 190-92, both Messaoudi and Benounne demonstrate fundamentalists' use of shari'a,
particularly traditional rules requiring that women veil themselves, tojustify acts of extreme
violence against women. See id. at 108-16; Bennoune, supra note 34 at 187-90.
99. See MESSAOUDI &SCHEMLA, supranote 1, at 32-45, 71-81; supra text accompanying
note 24.
100. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 71-81.
101. See id. at 76.
102. See id. at 77. Messaoudi notes that she had not learned about the holocaust during
her youth in Algeria and was ignorant of the holocaust until she first visited France. See id.
at 39, 76.
103. See id. at 77.
104. See id.
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Like other Algerians, Algerian fundamentalists may not know
a great deal about Islam or Islamist culture; fundamentalist notions
of what Islamic tradition requires may have no relationship to the
practice of the Islam religion by the typical Algerian.
Fundamentalism has been imported to Algeria from Iran and Saudi
Arabia."0 5 Consequently, Algerian fundamentalists may not have
experienced the conservative traditions they espouse at all.
Instead, they may have familiarity only with an Islam which
protected women but did not usually veil them, let alone injure or
Young, ignorant Islamists are therefore
denigrate them."°
borrowing fundamentalist ideas that they do not wholly
understand. These Islamists are acting in the tradition of the
07
countless powerful Islamic men who have come before them.
They manipulate their religion and its holy laws to justify their
endsl°-in this case, largely atrocities against women. They have
been brainwashed, it seems, by visions of power and control.'0 9 A
consideration of their actions, however, reveals that they are hardly
innocent.
A survey of news articles concerning events in Algeria during
the mid-1990s demonstrates the heartbreaking extent of the
violence that the GIA has directed toward women. 10 At their
kindest, these Islamists have leveled death threats against female
intellectuals, students, and journalists, as well as against women
who refused to wear the hijab,or veil."' At their most brutal, these
extremists have subjected women to rape," 2 to forced marriage,"'
105. See supra notes 39, 91, and accompanying text.
106. See MEssAOUDi & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 10-11 (discussing the unique nature of
Algerian Islam); id. at 18-28 (concerning the variations of Islamic tradition that Algerian
women of different classes and regions experience).
107. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015, 1018-19
(1991) (discussing Muslim rulers who derive religious authority and legitimacy not from
possessing theoretical requisites for office but from their enforcement of the shari'a).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
109. As a part of their campaign for power and control, fundamentalists seek to control
women and sexuality. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
110. See Bennoune, supra note 34, at 203-08.
111. See id. It is important to note that the h/jab is new to Algeria. Bennoune explains
that the women there have covered their heads and faces with white silk drapes and lace
kerchiefs for hundreds of years, but that the hijab of the fundamentalists was first brought
to Algeria during the 1970s. See id. at 188. As Hillary Rodham Clinton noted in her 1999
visit to Tunisia, Islamists also harm those whose skirts they believe to be too short. See First
Lady Decries Algeria Violence, CI. TREB., Mar. 26, 1999, at C1, available in 1999 WL
2857432 (relating the splashing of girls' legs with acid).
112. See supra note 9.
113. See Robert Fisk, HundredsDie in Algerian Slaughter,INDEPENDENT, Aug. 30, 1997,
at 9, available in WL INDEPNDNT database. Forced marriage is also called temporary
marriage, or zaouadj el moutad. In such a "marriage," a woman is united with a man for
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to domestic abuse,"" and to murder'1 --including murder performed
with a signature slashing of the victim's throat."1 Fundamentalist
violence has brought about tragic results, apart from bodily injuries
or bloodshed. Some "tainted" or "unchaste" victims of rape have
been exiled from their families."1 ' Others have become pregnant,
without the option of abortion.18
Still other, comparatively
fortunate women, live in fear. Feeling that they are forced to wear
the hijab," 9 they hide their identities and their sexuality from the
world around them.120 Every day, these women cannot help but
recognize the inequality imposed upon them. They see it
symbolically; the veils that cover them represent it. No matter how
much the Islamists seek to justify their violence against Algerian
women by invoking (and abusing) holy scripture and canon law,
they cannot explain away these abuses, let alone make them right
or consistent with the true teachings of Islam.12

only hours or days. According to Khalida Messaoudi, it is essentially a sort of forced
prostitution, which Islamists impose while using religion as an excuse. Essentially, these
marriages destroy women. Ifwomen comply with the Islamists' wishes, they lose their virtue
and status in society-, if they refuse, Islamists rape and kill them. See MESSAOUDI &
SCHEMIA, supranote 1, at 114.
114. See MESAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 111.
115. See, e.g., id. at 114 (concerning the killing ofwomen who refuse temporary marriage);
Bennoune, supra note 34, at 203-08 (discussing numerous slayings); Skilbeck, supra note 1
(commenting on the "trend" of killing women); Women Decapitatedin Gruesome Prelude to
Algerian Election, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 21, 1999, availablein 1999 WL 2667954.
116. See, e.g., Bodies of Six Kidnapped Girls Found, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Dec. 18, 1998, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Bbcmir File ("Mhe girls..
. had their throats cut.*); Janine Di Giovanni, Freedom Fighters,TIMES (London), Dec. 5,
1998, at 16, availablein 1998 WL 23398424 (describing throat-slitting as "a popular method
of killing known as the 'Algerian smile"); Lara Marlowe, SpiralofAtrocity Brings More New
HorrorsEvery Week to Algeria'sTorturedPeople, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 14,1997, at 10, available
in 1997 WL 12019976 ("Throat-slitting and decapitation had become routine .... "); Still
Afflicted by Violence, supranote 48 ('Algerian rebels slashed the throats of 22 people....-).
117. See Chelala, supranote 8.
118. See Chelala, supranote 1L
119. See Bennoune, supra note 34, at 187 ("None of us want to wear the veil. But fear is
stronger than our convictions or our will to be free.'). Given the greater likelihood of death
for women without a veil, it is reasonable to say that there is at least an implicit threat
driving many of these women to don the hUab. See id.
120. See id.
121. See supranotes 74-109 and accompanying text.
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THE FAMILY CODE AND FEMALE DENIGRATION

Shari'aas a Basis
Algeria's Family Code (1984) is based on shari'a law.'22 As

such, the Family Code originated in male, and generally misogynist,
interpretations of Islamic holy texts. 3 As the previous part
explained, shari'ahas historically represented, and continues to
represent, misinterpretations of Islamic tenets. 124 Yet shari'a

remains authoritative in providing the law, either in whole or in
part, in countries with substantial Muslim populations. 25
Despite the efforts of the GIA, Algeria is not an Islamic state.
Only its Family Code reflects shari'a.126 Consequently, centuries of

Islamic misogyny and gynophobia control the one sector of Algerian
law that most affects women. 127 Criticism after criticism has been
launched at the Family Code since well before its adoption and
implementation in 1984.128 These criticisms, generally launched by
women and, particularly by outspoken feminists such as Khalida

Messaoudi, fault the Family Code for placing Algerian women in a
weakened position and for being unconstitutional. 129

122. See supra note 73 and accompanying text
123. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 74-109 and accompanying text.
125. Ann Elizabeth Mayer notes that, over the centuries, rulers in the Islam world who
are not descended from Mohammed or his tribe have strictly enforced shari'a in part as a
means of legitimizing their own authority. See Mayer, supranote 107, at 1018-19. Mayer
demonstrates the great power of the Islamic holy law in largely Muslim countries, even over
non-Muslims. See id. at 1022-24. She also points out that the modernization of many
Islamic countries has led to some limitation of the application of shari'a;for example, many
governments have dispensed with other aspects of holy law but, like Algeria, have retained
its control over "personal status rules," or family law. See id. at 1026-28. Additionally,
Mayer recognizes the tendency of shari'alaw to conflict with countries' secular law. See id.
at 1028-52.
126. See id. at 1034 (citing only the Family Code in a discussion regarding the status of
shari'alaw under the 1989 constitution of Algeria).
127. Journalist Geraldine Brooks discusses the impact of misogyny on Islam and on its
laws. See New Book, supra note 39.
128. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 49-56 (explaining the Family Code, the
problems that Messaoudi and other women have with it, and the protests they have made
to it). Mayer also notes objections that women have raised to the Family Code. See Mayer,
supra note 107, at 1034.
129. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 49; Mayer, aupranote 107, at 1033-35.
Mayer explains the specific problems with the Family Code, as it conflicts with the 1989
Algerian Constitution. First, the Code's "provisions seem to violate the rights provisions of
the . . . constitution, which include a provision for equality before the law without
discrimination on the basis of gender .... " Id. at 1034. In addition, there is a legitimacy
problem with the Family Code. The constitution is largely secular, referring only
occasionally to Islam and never referring to shari'a.See id. at 1032. Its Preamble declares
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Few Rights for Women Treated as Minors
Professor Ann Elizabeth Mayer comments, "The 1984 law [the
Family Code] has many features that discriminate against Algerian
women in ways they find highly objectionable." 3 ' Essentially, the
Family Code infantilizes women, leaving them voiceless and
without adult privileges or powers." 1
Khalida Messaoudi gives a basic explanation of how the Family
Code relegates women to the status of children:
In this Code, Algerian women exist henceforth only as
"daughters of," "mothers of," or "wives of." They are not
individuals in their own right. On five points--education, work,
marriage, divorce, and inheritance-this text makes them
eternal minors, who go from dependency on their father,
brother, or closest male relative to dependency on their
husband." 2
This system of dependency leaves Algerian women voiceless.
All decisions are left to, or permitted to be left to, men.s Article
39 of the Family Code requires a woman "to obey her husband and
that it is the supreme law of Algeria. See id. at 1033. In addition, it seems to provide that
secular legislation is superior to holy law in Article 7, which provides, 'Thepeople are the
source of all power. National sovereignty belongs to the people.' Id. at 1033 (quoting the
Algerian Constitution). Mayer interprets these two provisions, the Preamble and Article 7,
as suggesting that the constitution should "override" the conflicting sharia.based Family
Code. See id. at 1033. Despite her suggestion, ten years after the implementation of the
constitution, the Family Code goes undisturbed. See Algerian Govt Silent on Violence
Against Women: Rights Watchdog,AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, Jan. 21,1999, availablein 1999
WL 2532850 [hereinafter Algerian Govt Silent] (discussing the determination of the
International Federation on Human Rights (FIDH) that the Family Code permits "organized
subordination of women").
130. Mayer, supranote 107, at 1034. Mayer lists a number of examples of discrimination
against women by the Family Code. See id. at 1034 n.64.
131. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supranote 1,at 52. Official attempts to delegitimize the
Family Code fall flat in view of its very oppression of women. When one considers the
information available revealing the low status and poor treatment of women in Algeria, it
is difficult to take seriously the attempts of Algeria's U.N. Ambassador to make Algeria's
official position toward women seem positive. The Ambassador told the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women that
In daily life, Algerian women were benefiting from rights and freedoms that
went well beyond the boundaries of the Family Code.... Indeed, some of its
provisions were crumbling, as real-life practices threatened to consign outdated
ones to the trashbin of history. Even now, the women's Convention had
absolute primacy over Algerian law, including the Family Code.
Algerian Women Full Actors in Political,Economic Life, supra note 7.
132. MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 52.
133. See id. at 52-54.
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to accord him respect as the head of the household.""34 Under that
article, "a man who wants his wife to stop working can force her to
stop, because she owes him obedience."135 In addition, "[t]he Family
Code limits a woman's ability to leave the house without the
permission of her husband." 3 ' Algerian men even have the ability
to vote on behalf of their wives.1 7 Moreover, men (as husbands)
make all decisions concerning their children; women have no official
say in these matters.13 8 Messaoudi comments on the true tragedy
of the silencing of women by the Family Code and by the men in
their lives: "[No one knows what Algerian women would say if
they were truly allowed to express themselves freely, without their
father, or husband, or brother, or imam looking over their
shoulder." s
The Family Code does more than merely silence women. It
forces them to surrender any control that they might wish to have
over their personal lives." For example, Article 9 of the Family
Code requires that women "obtain the consent of a marriage
guardian, normally the bride's father, in order to marry.""' At first
consideration, Article 9 may seem rather harmless, as other
cultures carry traditions of consent before marriage. 142 Yet,
whereas such consent is often little more than a formality, in
Algeria, it is the law under all circumstances. Messaoudi explains,
"whether a woman is single, divorced, a widow with or without
children, illiterate, educated, a housewife, a magistrate, or a
minister, she can never arrange a marriage herself."" 3 In addition,
134. Mayer, supranote 107, at 1034 n.64.

135. MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 52.
136. Entelis, supra note 4, at 1278.
137. Should the fundamentalists succeed in creating an Islamic state, women will be
denied the vote altogether. See Peter A. Samuelson, PluralismBetrayed.. The BattleBetween
Secularism and Islam in Algeria's Questfor Democracy,20 YALE J. INTL. L. 309, 351 (1995).
See generally MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1 (discussing the political process in
Algeria).

138. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 53-54. This fact becomes tragically
significant in situations of divorce, in which women may gain custody of their children, but
the custody is meaningless because they have no guardianship rights. See id.
139. Id. at 60.
140. See Mayer, supra note 107, at 1034 n.64.
141. Id.
142. See Entelis, supranote 4, at 1277 n.207.
143. MES5AOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 53. Messaoudi explains the nightmarish
nature of this requirement by reviewing the situation of an Algerian woman named Leila
Aslaoui:
Here is an important magistrate-a woman who had vitriol thrown on her by
the fundamentalists during the 1980s, who was named minister in 1991-92 and
again in 1994, and whose husband, a dentist, had his throat savagely cut in his
office by the armed wing of the F.I.S. in November 1994-who, if she wanted to
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a woman, if Muslim, is legally barred by Article 31 from marrying
a non-Muslim.'"
Just as the Family Code subjects a woman to male approval
when she wishes to marry, it restricts her freedom to divorce her
husband. Whereas, under Article 48, a man has the freedom to
divorce whenever he wishes, a woman does not. 14 As Mayer
explains, "article 53 requires the wife to establish certain grounds
in order to qualify for a divorce." 14 Messaoudi comments that these
grounds are "in practice, impossible to prove." 14

According to

Messaoudi, another type of divorce is open to women. Called khol'a,
it is available provided that women seek no alimony. 148 Thus, the
Family Code attempts to keep Algerian women from seeking their
freedom, and it penalizes them when they persevere and attain it.149
Overall, the Code prevents women from controlling the
essential aspects of their own lives. Under the Family Code, just as
they have no say concerning their marriage or work and only an
economically self-defeating mechanism for attaining a divorce, any
authority that women may exercise over their children is a mere
formality. 50 Mothers' custody over children upon divorce is in
name only, for men remain children's guardians. 5 1
Another divorce-related problem in Algeria concerns housing.
Messaoudi explains:
[A divorced woman] can never find housing, in reality....
[When there is only one residence for the two spouses, it always
remarry one day, would be obliged to go through the law of the matrimonial
guardian.
Id. at 53.
144. See Mayer, supra note 107, at 1034 n.64.
145. See id. Messaoudi describes this type of divorce as "an abusive, unilateral divorce-a
repudiation that dares not speak its name." MEssAoUDi & SCHLEMA, aupranote 1, at 53.
146. Mayer, supra note 107, at 1034 n.64. Entelis explains that these grounds include
insanity and abuse. See Entelis, supranote 4, at 1277.
147. MEssAoUDi & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 53.
148. See id. Messaoudi also discusses the dire conditions that divorced women and their
children suffer. Without the benefits of alimony or a home, many find themselves
'wandering" the streets. See id. at 53-54.
149. See id. at 53 ("Kholla is the problematic ransom that women must pay for their
freedom, just like slaves."). Entelis explains that khol'a, or khul, may involve a payment of
monetary reparation by the wife to the husband. It originally involved the woman returning
the dowry, but now, generally, the payment is more than the dowry. See Entelis, supra note
4, at 1277 & n.214.
150. See MEsSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 53 (discussing the resulting
powerlessness of women concerning their children's lives).
151. See id. at 53 ("The mother automatically has the right to custody, but not the right
to be her children's guardian."); Entelis, supranote 4, at 1278 (noting that, under the Family
Code, the father is the guardian of his minor children).
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goes to the husband, without the possibility of any recourse

(article 52, line 3). Then, supposing that the family owns
several residences, the husband typically skirts the law by
temporarily signing the other residences over to a third party,
just for the duration of the divorce.152
Given the extreme poverty' 53 and the housing shortage154 in
Algeria, divorced women, along with their children, may wind up
without homes. 155 Of course, the reality of this homelessness stands
as a deterrent to divorce and another means of keeping women
subject to male authority.
A final aspect of the Family Code that harms women is their
inability to voice opinions concerning their husbands' decisions to
take additional wives." Article 8 of the Family Code addresses
polygamy. It "allows men to marry up to four women at one time
while women are required to be monogamous." 57 Women have no
right to contract against polygamy when they marry. 58 Even
worse, their husbands may force their various wives to live together
under one roof.159 The Draft Law of April 1998 attempted to amend
the Family Code's polygamy provisions to benefit women.160 April
1998's draft law, a proposed amendment to the Family Code, would
require men to obtain their wife's or wives' and their prospective
wife's consent before taking another wife.'"' This Note will address
the insignificance of this apparently progressive proposed
legislation.
This section has demonstrated the oppressive force of the
Family Code, which renders women as powerless as their children.
It is this force that will render new legislation in Algeria ineffective
in changing the daily realities of Algerian women.

152. MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 53. Regardless of marriage or divorce,
women have another property problem in Algeria: their inheritance rights. Messaoudi

explains that under sharida and the Family Code, they are entitled to only half the property
that men are. She suggests that this is a perfect example of the selective application of
shari'afor the specific purpose of'oppress[ing] women." See id. at 54

153. See id. at 61.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See id. at 58.
See i& at 64.
See id. at 53.
Mayer, supra note 107, at 1034 n.64.

158. See Enteis, supranote 4, at 1277.
159. See iii

160. See AlgeriaProposes Rights Law, supra note 3.
161. See id.
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THE CURRENT REALITY: ALGERIAN WOMEN IN THE NEWS

Emblematic of the Situation in Algeria
There is a constant flow of news concerning the violence in
Algeria, but this news is not always readily accessible, and the
press cannot always tell the full story. 62 Despite the questionable
reliability of reports concerning events in Algeria, it is impossible
to deny that the country is in crisis. Indeed, the Algerian identity
crisis plays itself out clearly in reports revealing the treatment of
Algerian women.'" Violence against women in Algeria, along with
attempts to restrict and control their freedoms and progress, speaks
tomes about the desperate attempts of the rebels to establish an
Islamist Algerian identity while the government seeks to
institutionalize an all-Arabic culture.
The Forcing of the Veil
The recent insistence of Islamists that Algerian women wear
the veil, or hijab, carries with it a particular irony. Although some
Islamic and Arab history in Algeria is undeniable, 164 given the
country's history of colonization,165 particularly its rather recent
rule by France, 1" it can hardly be defined by Islam alone. Indeed,
one can safely say that Algerians practice (or would practice, if they
were free to) their own special brand of Islam that has
167 been
influenced by the country's ethnically hybridized history.
As an example of the unique nature of Algerian Islam, unlike
in many Islamic cultures, the hijab has played no traditional role
in Algeria.'" Consequently, when Islamic extremists threaten,
rape, and kill women who do not wear the hijab, their wish to
transform Algerian culture into an Islamist state makes itself

162. See supranotes 62-67 and accompanying text (discussing reporting problems).
163. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
164. See supranotes 22-40 and accompanying text
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Cf MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supranote 1, at 9-17 (discussing the Islamic upbringing
of Messaoudi, a Berber who has become a secularist); Chayes & Gladstone, supra note 25
(noting that radical Islamists seek to make Algerians, particularly Berbers, practice an
unfamiliar type of Islam).
168. See supratext accompanying notes 2240. Bennoune comments that the focus on the
veil reveals 'the misuse ofconcepts such as 'traditional' in relation to events in Algeria." She
also notes, "Algerian peasant women have never veiled, but have instead worn scarves tied

only over part of their hair." Bennoune, supra note 34, at 188.
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plain."6 9 Both Karima Bennoune, an authority on Algeria, and
Khalida Messaoudi point out that the forcing of the hijab and the
associated violence have much to do with silencing women who
challenge the conservative moral and behavioral standards that the
government officially sanctions and that the Islamist extremists
seek to strengthen.170 The radicals' threats and violence extend to
quieter women, even veil-wearing women, in their desperation to
seek control and to silence any difference or disagreement within
the society they hope to transform."'
The veil carries various symbolic meanings. Many of these
meanings speak volumes about Islamist extremism and about the
172
inability of outsiders to understand its radical conservatism.
Yvonne Haddad, a scholar of Islam, has called the veil 'the silk
curtain... the divide between Islam and the West. 1 73 Professor
Marnia Lazreg comments on the veil as a device of mystery and
misunderstanding: "The persistence of the veil as a symbol
that
essentially stands for women illustrates the difficulty researchers
have in dealing with a reality with which they are unfamiliar. It
also reveals an attitude of mistrust. A veil is a hiding device; it
arouses suspicion."174 Thus, different views on the veil reveal a vast
gulf between the Islamist world view that supports the hijab and
the more liberal world view that mistrusts it.
Islamists seem to set great store in the different functions of
the veil, as it hides women from view, covers their sexuality, and
sets visual, physical, and moral boundaries. 175 Rod Skilbeck gives
an example of the veil as a symbol of the fundamentalists' values:
"All the veil stands for: modesty, obedience, sexual probity,
176
conformity-are expressed publicly and overtly when [it is] worn."

169. See supra text accompanying notes 41-67 (discussing the goals of the GIA).
170. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 109-14; Bennoune, supra note 34, at

197-98.
171. See MES&AOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 109.
172. See Lazreg, supra note 1, at 328.

173. In IslamicNations, the Veil is Lifting, supra note 77.
174. Lazreg, supra note 1, at 329.
175. See FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE 85-101 (Mary Jo Lakeland

trans., Addison Wesley 1991) (discussing the mythology, history, functions, and value of the
hijab).
176. Skilbeck, supra note 1. Mernissi provides an Islamic history that supports the veil's
value in standing for these ideals. She notes, however, the ironic significance of the hijab to
various Muslim sects throughout history. For example, it has been recognized as a sign of
the damned, in that it hides people from God, and as a means of separating the private
sphere (which traditionally has belonged to women) from the public. See MERNISSI, supra
note 175, at 93-101.
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In Algeria's holy war, the veil holds great significance to the
extremists.'
Fatima Mernissi observes that contemporary
Muslims in search of identity "put the accent on the confinement of
women as the solution for a pressing crisis."'78 She elaborates,
"[pirotecting women from change by veiling them and shutting
them out of the world has echoes of closing the community to
protect it from the West." 7 9 Mernissi acknowledges a "double
perspective" unique to conservative Muslims: they see the
"women's [sic] body as symbolic representation of community." 180
This split vision of women leads to threats and violence, as
Islamists attempt to promote and contain their goal of an Islamic
state and as they seek to prevent progressive (i.e., Western, or
Western-seeming) "others" from thwarting their cause. 8 '
Targetingof Working Women
Professional women have been among the targets of Islamist
terrorism.'8 2 These women stand as a legitimate, although small,

threat to the fundamentalists in that they are very much "others."
Few women assume professional roles in present-day Algeria." s
Many women occupy traditional roles in the home."' In addition,
in a country in dire economic trouble, many women are
unemployed. " ' Despite the violence of the extremists against them,
these women seek jobs.
Islamist extremists have addressed much of their violence
toward female professionals in Algeria." They have threatened
and murdered numerous female teachers and professors, 87 as well
as many women journalists.8 s Those whom they cannot kill, they
try to scare.' 89 For example, in 1993, the FIS issued afatwa (in this
177. See generally MERNISSI, supra note 175 (describing the significance of the veil).
178. Id. at 99.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supranote 1, at 109 (discussing the relationship between
sexuality, political upheaval, and the h/jab).
182. See Bennoune, supra note 34, at 188, 190-92.

183. See High Unemployment RateAmongAlgerian Women, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY,
Mar.
8,
1998
(visited
Jan.
18,
2000)
<httpJ/www.africanews.org/north/algeria/stories/19980308_featl.html>.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1,pasim; Bennoune, supra note 34, pasim.
187. See Bennoune, supra note 34, at 188, 190-91.

188. See id. at 190-91.
189. See id. at 190-92.
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case, a death edict) against prominent feminist Khalida Messaoudi,
who opposes the Islamist mission and who remains active in
Algerian politics despite the fatwa.' 90
The War Against Women
The civil war in Algeria, recently condemned by Hillary
Rodham Clinton as civil "in name only,"' 91 characterizes itself as a
campaign concerning sexuality.'92 Consequently, it hardly restricts
its attacks to working women or to women without veils. 193 In
attacks on Algerian towns and villages, violence is performed
against all walks of life, including men as well as women.' 94 Yet,
the most hideous crimes are committed against women in the name
of religion.195 An astounding number of these acts are what
Westerners think of as sex crimes: rapes and "forced,""temporary,"
or (ironically enough) "pleasure marriages."' 9 Often, these sex
crimes end in murder.'97 Along with the killings of those who go
unveiled and those who work outside of the private realm, these
rape-murders are characterized by sexuality and fear. These crimes
can be classified as murders of the "other"-of woman, who stands
for the community'" and yet whom the Islamists see as foreign, as
frightening.' 99

190. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 1-8 (discussing the fatwa and life in
hiding).
191. See FirstLady Decries Algeria Violence, supra note 111.
192. See MEssAouDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 110.
193. Most news articles about the war provide reports of gruesome killings of men, as well
as of rapes and murders of women. See, e.g., Group of Men Massacres 31 People in Algeria
Village, Paper Reports, CH. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 3516642
(hereinafter Group of Men).
194. See id.; Algerian Civilians in Night Long Vigils To Prevent Massacres,AFRICA NEWS
ONLINE,
Sept.
15,
1997
(visited
Jan.
18,
2000)
<http:/twww.africanews.org/north/algeria/stories/19970912_feat2.html>.
195. See, e.g., Charles Sennott, Atrocities Targeted Young Women, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Nov. 3, 1997, at A10, available in WL 11/03/1997 GLOBEMAIL A10 ('The
attackers are believed to rape the women with a warped religious rationale that the women
will be defiled in the eyes of Islam and therefore unable to enter heaven.").
196. See Chelala, supra note 8. The frighteningly large corrected numbers of victims of
these crimes take into account underreporting of sex crimes, disappearances of shamed and
traumatized victims, and deaths of unaccounted rape-murder victims. See Crisis-First
CenterofSupportforRaped Women Opened Last Month, MIDDLE EAsTTIMES, Nov. 19,1998,
availablein LEXIS News Library, MOCLIP File; see also supra note 9.
197. See Chelala, supra note 11.
198. See MERNISSI, supranote 175, at 99.
199. See MESsAoUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 109.
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1998 DRAFT LAW FOR

ALGERIAN WOMEN

What Does It Give Women?
The April 1998 draft law on women's rights, which the Algerian
government has approved 200 but has not yet passed into law,2"' is
meant to replace or amend some of the portions of the Family Code
that severely oppress women.20 2 The law seems to "make it harder
for men to have more than one wife at a time."20 3 It requires men to
obtain the consent of any existing wives, and the prospective wife,
to a polygamous marriage in order for that marriage to be legal. 0 4
Under the Family Code, men control a woman's marital destiny.20 5
The proposed requirement of female consent symbolizes a
tremendous shift in the Algerian approach to marriage. It would
give women some control over an aspect of their lives in which they
previously had no say.
In addition, this new law would improve women's custody
rights in the event of divorce. 2' For example, it "would entitle a
woman to own the family home"207 if a court grants her custody of
her children. 2 ' This proposed legislation takes an important step,
considering the dire straits of many divorced women in Algeria who
give up support rights, experience economic difficulties, and may
even find themselves-and their children-homeless.2 9 It would
solidify a woman's right to her children and her ability to support
them. Economic instability or homelessness could not cause a court
200. See Algeria ProposesRights Law, supra note 3.
201. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
202. See Algerian Women Full Actors in Political,Economic Life, supra note 7.

[Nadia Benabdellah, Adviser to the Algerian Ministry of Justice, recently
explained to the United Nations that 22 proposals to amend the Family Code

had] been submitted to Parliament for consideration and adoption. The
proposed amendments constituted major progress, in that, for example, they
would guarantee housing to mothers with care of their children, and divorce

would no longer be solely by the will of the husband, but could be requested by
either spouse.

Id.; see also Algeria Proposes Rights Law, supra note 3; supra notes 122-61 and
accompanying text.
203. Algeria Proposes Rights Law, supra note 3.

204. See id.
205. No Algerian woman can marry without consent of a male "marriage guardian." See

supratext accompanying note 141
206. See Algeria ProposesRights Law, supranote 3.
207. Id.

208. Courts generally give custody to the mother in divorce-custody battles. See supra
notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
209. See supranotes 151-55 and accompanying text.
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to call her parental fitness into question, a terrible event that could
reasonably occur under the present Family Code. In a country
where custody does not equate with guardianship, 10 the
entitlement of women to a home seems to give more meaning to a
woman's status as a custodial parent. 211

Like the draft law's

provision concerning polygamy, this custody provision would send
an important message to Algerians, particularly to Algerian men,
regarding the need to view women differently and to arm them with
increased rights.1 2 Only by improving the treatment of women can
Algerians protect and ensure a future of any kind.2 13
An Empty Gesture
Although the Algerian government undeniably has made a
positive step in approving the April 1998 draft law, the proposed
law is of dubious importance. Consider the everyday lives of
Algerian women, who face Islamist abuses of sharia,2 1 4
victimization-even death-under "holy" war,216 and numerous
other injustices under the Family Code.216 In view of these daily
nightmares, as well as other aspects of Algerian life, this piece of
legislation loses meaning and shows its true face.
The draft law's provision concerning polygamy will have little
meaning for most Algerian women. 2 7 Few Algerians practice
polygamy. 28 As Nadia Benabdellah, Adviser to the Algerian
Ministry of Justice, recently explained to the United Nations,
"[P]olygamy [is] marginal and exist[s] mainly in rural areas. In
210. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
211. Custody is meaningless without a home, especially when women are functionally
powerless over their children's lives. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51. Divorced
women's entitlement to the family home also seems progressive in its recognition of
children's need for protection, especially given the violence and turmoil that are daily
realities in Algeria.
212. See generallyAlgeria Proposes Rights Law, supra note 3 (describing the proposed
changes and possible effects).
213. The fimdamentalists' bloody campaign, particularly against women, in hopes of
establishing an Islamic state, makes an absolute extermination of Algerians seem
frighteningly imminent. See supradiscussion notes 41-67 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 68-121 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 162-99 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 122-61 and accompanying text.
217. Nevertheless, it will make an important difference for the few women whose lives it
affects. Messaoudi explains, "[wives in polygamous marriages are] haunted by [polygamy],
and they're right to be. They attack the 'asahole' who does that for sex and to have a second
wife who can act as a supplementary work force." MEssAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at
111.
218. "([Plolygamy isn't widely practiced." Id.
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Algeria, the situation involve[s] bigamy more than polygamy, and
it affect[s] less than 5 percent of the married population. 2 9
Without a doubt, consent would be meaningful for the few women
implicated by this amendment of the Family Code. Yet one must
wonder why Algeria would publicly announce its possible
amendment of a law with so little real significance for women,22 °
when -other aspects of the Family Code impact upon-and
oppress--most, if not all, women. 21 Algeria, along with other
countries in the Islamic world, has been "under the gun" for its
human rights abuses, particularly those against women. 222 Is this
proposed polygamy law merely a matter of the government paying
lip service to the United Nations-and the world at largeconcerning its need to remedy those abuses?
The proposed custody amendment to the Family Code appears
as insignificant as the polygamy provision. As discussed above,
under the everyday reality of the Family Code, women's custody of
their children is essentially meaningless.2
Men, the legal
guardians, must sign all consent papers concerning children; 24 men
are the true decisionmakers within families. In truth, because
Algerian personal status law (shari'a)treats women as minors, they
have no real power over their children or their children's lives.2 25
Because a mother's custody means nothing, the mere
"improvement" of her custody rights means very little. Short of
eliminating shari'a as it concerns parental rights, it seems that
Algeria could do little to "improve" women's custody rights in any
meaningful way.
The practical irrelevance of the provision for a custodial
mother's entitlement to the family home demonstrates that the
draft law's consideration of custody under the Family Code will do
little or nothing to improve the situation of the single mother, or
her children, in Algeria. First of all, there is seldom a family
219. Algerian Women FullActors in Political,Economic Life, supra note 7.
220. In January 1999, speaking before the United Nations, Nadia Benabdellah alluded to
a number of proposed amendments to the Family Code. See id. Yet it seems that the
Algerian government has disseminated to the international press only information about the
amendments concerning polygamy, custody, and property rights. See, e.g., AlgeriaProposes
Rights Law, supra note 3.

221. See supra notes 122-61 and accompanying text (concerningwomen's voicelessness in
their marriage choices and family lives and their difficulty in obtaining divorces from their

husbands).
222. See, e.g., AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 61, at 79-82; Algerian Govt Silent, supranote
129; FirstLady Decries Algeria Violence, supra note 111.

223. See supranotes 150-51 and accompanying text.
224. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 26.
225. See id.
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property for a woman to have upon divorce.228 Algeria's economic
crisis, and an influx of its people to cities, 22' has created a dire
housing shortage.228 Second, Algeria is a country at war. That war
has been characterized in part by the looting, pillaging, and
destruction of homes and villages throughout the country. 22 9 Thus,
many homes that might have been accessible to divorced custodial
mothers under sunnier circumstances have been destroyed. 210
Finally, some men, particularly wealthy men with multiple homes,
go out of their way to deprive women of property while their
divorces are pending. 231 Just as wealthy men with multiple homes
find "loopholes" through which they can avoid giving homes to their
226. Under current law, a couple's home goes to the man upon divorce. See MESSAOUDI
& SCHEMLA, supranote 1, at 54. However, for the reasons discussed below, there might not
be a home to which a woman could be entitled, even ifthe law provided for it. See infra text
accompanying notes 227-31
227. Much of this influx results from civilians fleeing villages to escape repeated attacks
from Islamic extremists. See, e.g., 19 Algerian Villagers, Including Five Girls, Murdered,
Jan. 13, 1997 (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.alenafix.com/oldfbg/articles/algeria01.htm1>. However, the city seemsjust as dangerous as the villages, only
in different ways. See, e.g., Group of Men, supranote 193 (explaining efforts to prevent car
bombings in Algiers); Marlowe, supra note 116 ("A man who recently returned to Algiers
after a long absence was appalled by the changed mentality. The person I'd entrusted my
house to sold it while I was away.').
228. Messaoudi describes the extent of the housing shortage. See MESSAOUDI &SCHEMLA,
supra note 1, at 58 ('I
was very lucky because my future husband, being a teacher, already
had a room and was soon to have an apartment. Do you realize what a privilege that is in
an overpopulated country where available housing is painfully short?).
229. See, e.g., AMNESTY REPOlrr, supra note 61, at 79 ("[In 19971 [alt least 2,000 civilians
...were killed in large-scale massacres by armed groups in rural areas. The victims were
slaughtered, decapitated, mutilated, shot, or burned alive in their homes."); Stefan Lovgren,
Algeria's State of Fear:'The Power versus IslamicRadicals, with Villagers as Pawns, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., June 2, 1997, at 41 ("In a farming commune outside Bougara, a small
town less than 20 miles southeast of Algiers, a three-legged dog rummages through partly
burnt-out dwellings, now deserted after more than 120 people were killed in an orgy of
savagery the week before."); Lara Marlowe, DisasterArea, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 4, 1998, at 61,
availablein 1998 WL 13630866 ('In Algeria, bands of roving killers wipe out whole villages
by night, burning or mutilating and beheading men and women, infants and old people.).
230. The destruction has not left cities, such as Algiers, the capital, unscathed. See, e.g.,
Lovgren, supranote 229 (discussing destruction caused in Algiers by car bombs). It is also
important to not. that an executive decree from the Algerian government has made it a legal
requirement that the government allow financial assistance to families of individuals who
are killed or wounded, or who disappear, during terrorist attacks. This decree also requires
the state to reimburse victims for 100% of the property (including real estate) that they lose
during attacks. The law, however, is complicated, and many victims have not received
remuneration or justice because of a requirement of extensive proof of damage or
victimization. See Terrorism& Victims'Rights in Algeria: How Are the Victims Assisted, N.
AFP J. & MAGHREB WKLY. MONITOR, May 9,1998 (visited Oct. 28,1998) <http'/www.northafrica.comlarchives/doc/050998A.htm>; Sarah Chayes & Bob Edwards, Compensating
Algerian Survivors, NPRMORNING EDITION (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 18,1998), available
in LEXIS News Library, NPR File, Transcript # 98081904-210.
231. See MESSAOUDI & SCHEMIA, supra note 1, at 53-54.
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ex-wives, it seems likely that less wealthy men will find similar
ways to avoid the mandates of this proposed housing-entitlement
law.
Like the proposed polygamy amendment, the proposed custody
amendment appears to be nothing more than an empty gesture,
made to appease both Algerian women2 and international groups
pressuring Algeria.2" The tremendous force of the Family Code in
effect now, along with the very strength of the patriarchy in
Algeria-through law and religion-very likely may prevent the
passage of the April 1998 draft law and similar laws. Should the
Algerian parliament pass these laws, however, the power ofsharia
and the power of patriarchy will still prevent them from making
any great changes in Algerian society.
THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE ABORTION-RAPE FATwA
Nothing New
Despite the controversy,
confusion,
and delay236
surrounding the content of the HCI and Algerian government's
ruling concerning abortion for rape victims, that ruling carries as
little real impact and meaning as the proposed changes in the
Family Code. The fatwa issued did nothing to change the abortion
law originally effective in Algeria under shari'a." 7

232. Secular feminists such as Messaoudi have been outspoken in their opposition to the

Family Code and to human rights abuses against Algerian women. See, e.g., MESSAOUDI &
SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 150.

233. See supranote 222 and accompanying text.
234. See Chelala, supra note S(discussing the shock that resulted from the fatwa rumored
to have been issued on April 12, 1998, allowing abortions for Algerian rape victims).
235. See id. (relating the contradictory news reports about the rumored fatwa of April 12,
1998).

236. See Rachid Khiari, Algerian President Back to Official Business a Month After
Surgery, ASSOCIATED PRusS, Apr. 14, 1998, available in 1998 WL 6650741 (explaining that
the actual ruling, following the controversy over the rumored fatwa, was being delayed until
the president requested such a ruling).

237. See Algerian Religious Body Issues Fatwa on Rape, supra note 9. This article
explained the contents of the decree, which, according to the chairman of the HCI, stated
that abortion 'remained prohibited except under conditions already stipulated in a 1985
'health law." Id. That law already 'allows abortion for women who are the victims of rape

or incest when 'the physiological or mental equilibrium of the mother is in danger." Id. This
embodies the law of Islamic countries in general, which allow abortion in the instance of a

life-threatening pregnancy. See ia
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Dubious Effects of Formally ReinstatingChastity
In one regard, the fatwa went beyond allowing abortion in the
already permissible instances of physiological or psychological
danger. 28 The innovation of the fatwa is its provision that the
victim be considered chaste and that she not be "blamed or
punished." 9 This "new" aspect of the edict will not help Algerian
women in a meaningful way. Instead, it fails them in that it does
not solve the public or societal problems that cause Algeria's
violence, let alone these rape-induced pregnancies. It cannot end
the violence against women, just as it cannot put a stop to centuries
of denigration of and hatred toward women by Muslim
men-particularly conservative Muslim men.
Indeed, the mistake inherent in the abortion-rape fatwa is the
Hcrs apparent belief that it can mandate the thoughts and
emotions of Algerian citizens. Just as an edict cannot change
attitudes toward women in general, it cannot affect attitudes
toward the victims of rape, the particular women who stand for all
that is wrong in Algeria. It is likely, then, that family shame will
continue to derive from these rapes."' Although the government
has agreed to raise the children of these rapes,'4 pregnant victims
must spend nine months carrying these children and wear their
rapes for all of Algeria to see. The image of these tragic, pregnant
women, whose very lives seem to be punishments, demonstrates the
irony of the HCI's supposed solution in declaring them chaste and
stating that they cannot be punished.

23S. See id.

Victims will be given documents identifying them "formally" as such on the
basis of declarations by police and other witnesses.
After receiving psychiatric advice, adult rape victims may decide for
themselves whether they want an abortion, while minors will need a parent's
or guardian's permission.
Doctors may not invoke "the conscience clause" to avoid performing an
abortion for a woman acknowledged by a psychologist to be in danger, as

stipulated in the health law ....
Women determined to be "in a permanent state of depression and are (sic)
in danger of committing suicide" should be allowed to have abortions.

Like the provisions for providing financial aid to victims and their families, this system
under the fatwa will be only as good as the people who run it. Doubtless, its administrators
will deny abortions to many utterly desolate victims of terrorist rape.

239. Id. In conjunction with this no-blame provision, the fatwa provides that children of
rape will become wards of the state. See supra text accompanying note 21.
240. See supranote 11.

241. See supra text accompanying note 21.

642

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 6:611

Algerian women have praised the fatwa for the message it
sends concerning women's virtue. 4 2 Unfortunately, however, its
message is not truly helpful to the rape victims, or to any Algerian
women. Instead of helping female victims in any practical fashion,
this declaration of chastity and honor merely upholds a

questionable patriarchal tradition.
For Algerians, and particularly for Algerian men, women hold
the key to family respectability: "Men['s] ... whole sense of honor

is lodged in that little membrane, the hymen of their daughter or
sister.... 2 When Algerians perceive a woman as unchaste, they
can do remarkable damage to her, both physically'
and

psychologically,2" 5 as well as to the very concept of woman.2 '
The chastity-retention portion of the fatwa feeds this bizarre
and dangerous aspect of Algerian tradition and psychology by
attempting to restore female purity as the basis of family pride and
identity. In doing so, the edict does women in general no favors, as
it could by instead sending a specific progressive message that a

family's status and goodness exist independently of how its
daughters conducts themselves, independently of what they do with
242. For example, in an interview with an Algerian newspaper, Rabea Mechernene,
Algeria's National Solidarity Minister praised "the idea that raped women retain their
chastity." Algerian Religious Body Issues Fatwa on Rape, supra note 9.
243. MESAOUDI & SCHEMLA, Supra note 1, at 22. Messaoudi suggests that many IslamoAlgerian social traditions derive from this notion of woman as a symbol of honor, including
the veil and female isolation. See id at 21-22. She also provides examples of traditions,
rooted in shame, that are highly damaging to women and to the popular notion of women.
Among these are the tradition of a woman's in-laws returning her to her parents after her
wedding night if she is not a virgin. See id. at 22. Messaoudi explains how women in her
family would subvert this practice to protect a bride and prevent the shaming of her people:
[O]ur old women always had a rooster or a chicken tucked under their arm for
a marriage. If the bride wasn't a virgin any more, the women would kill the
animal, spread its blood on the sheets, and exhibit it triumphantly. It was
imperative to save appearances and honor-but, above all, to protect the clan
and the alliances that had been arranged.
Id. at 22.
244. The violence against Algerian women by fundamentalists stands as a frightening
example ofwhat happens when this woman-as-a-moral-symbol mentality spins out of control.
This violence, as well as the rapes leading to the fatwa under discussion, stems from
extremists' vision of contemporary Algerian women as deviations from their moral ideals, as
"others." See id. at 109.
245. For example, consider the trend of families exiling rape victims. See Chelala, supra
note 11.

246. Messaoudi's explanation of her ancestors' subterfuge to shield non-virgins
demonstrates the fact that, historically, women have failed to measure up to the high moral
standards set for them. This failure leads to dangerous double-standards, in which women
are prized as symbols of honor, and yet simultaneously stand for"desire, seduction, mystery,
trouble, and also alterity." MESSAOUDI & SCHEMLA, supra note 1, at 109. Consequently,
women are simultaneously revered and despised, protected and denigrated. In the (male)
public imagination, they possess meaning as symbols or objects only-never as individuals.
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their bodies or of what is done with their bodies. Such a message
would free Algerian women of their roles as moral barometers for
their families, rather than simply acting to reset rape victims'
barometers to a formally pure level."' 7
CONCLUSION

At first glance, Algeria's draft law of April 1998 and the
abortion-rape fatwa of April 1998 seem important as attempts to
improve the desperate situation of Algerian women, who are
currently victims of law, religion, and war. These pieces of legislation certainly mark positive steps for Algeria in that the government constructed them with women in mind. Unfortunately, however, these laws do not uplift Algerian women.
Yet, in a sense, these laws do more than merely affirm Algeria's
status quo. Inasmuch as they rely on stereotypes of women, as the
moral barometers of Algeria, they reinforce the country's status
quo.
On a symbolic level, these laws do represent women. Relatively
ignored' and rendered insignificant, the laws are much like the
women about and for whom they are made. In turn, those women,
contradictory figures-pure, even faithful, but desirous, mysterious,
bloody, unchaste-are emblematic of their country. Like those
women, Algeria is at war with itself. A mass of contradictions, its
identity is split, lost between Arab and Berber, Islam and Islamism.
Its men seek to define its identity, as they seek to define its
women's identities. In doing so, these men will destroy both the
nation and its women in the process. As with the destruction of its
women, the destruction of Algeria will go unnoticed.24
ANN LUERSSEN CROWTHER
247. The only truly constructive, pro-victim reaction to the numerous rapes during
Algeria's holy war has been the development of a hostel/support center for rape victims.
Information concerning the center is scarce, although reports indicate that the center
provides victims with rape-specific treatment from physicians and psychologists. See
Crisis-FirstCenterofSupportforRapedWomen Opened LastMonth, supranote 196; Hostel
Opens for Rape Victims, supra note 19.
248. Despite daily reports concerning abuses toward women in Algeria, the plight of
Algerian women-let alone all Algerians-receives little focus from the world-wide news
media. See supranotes 62-67 and accompanying text. Similarly, since April of 1998, both the
draft law on women's rights and the abortion-rape fatwa have received little media attention
at all, let alone in-depth consideration. See supranote 7 and accompanying text.
249. Given the ability of the world-at-large to ignore the abuses and horrors occurring
daly in Algeria, it will be no surprise if the nation's self-destruction goes unnoticed by the
rest of the world.

